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The right to the flow of income from water is vigorously  pursued, protected, and 
fought over in any arid part of the world. Pakistan is of course no exception. Reform of 
irrigation institutions necessarily changes the rights to water, whether it be those of 
farmers, government, or government functionaries. Those perceived rights may be 
explicit and broadly accepted, or simply takings that are not even considered legitimate. 
Nevertheless they will be fought over.  
Pakistan has a long history of proposals for irrigation reform, little or none being 
implemented, except as isolated pilot projects.  Thus, to propose major changes in 
irrigation institutions must be clearly shown to have major benefits to justify the hard 
battles that must be fought and the goodwill of those who might win those battles for 
reform. Proponents of irrigation institution reform have always argued the necessity of 
the reforms and the large gains to be achieved. Perhaps, however, those arguments have 
not been convincing. 
This paper will briefly outline the failed attempts at irrigation reform to provide 
an element of reality to the discussion. It will then proceed to make the case of the 
urgency of reform in a somewhat different manner to the past. Finally, current major 
reform proposals will be presented. 
This paper approaches justification of irrigation reform by focusing on the 
agricultural growth rate. It does so because that is the critical variable influencing 
poverty rates and is a significant determinant of over-all economic growth rates. The 
paper decomposes growth rates and suggests a residual effect of deterioration of the 
irrigation system that is large and calls for policy and institutional reform. The data are 
notional, suggesting the usefulness of the approach and paves the way for more detailed 
empirical analysis and enquiry for the future. 
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FAILED EFFORTS AT IRRIGATION REFORM 
In 1967, with World Bank assistance, an “Action Plan” was developed to 
improve irrigated agriculture. The plan, with its several major components, was soon 
judged a failure and so the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), this 
time with financial assistance from the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and technical assistance again from the World Bank prepared a Revised 
Action Plan (RAP) for irrigated agriculture.  
The RAP plan was approved in 1979. That plan called for major investments in 
physical infrastructure, much of which was made. It also laid special emphasis on 
improving the institutional framework so as to increase the efficiency of irrigated 
agriculture. A centre piece of the institutional change was better coordination between 
numerous agencies concerned with irrigated agriculture and improved research and 
extension. 
The institutional reforms called for by RAP were generally judged to have failed 
to be instituted or failed in their impact, or both. After many years of discussion of this 
situation a comprehensive study was undertaken and completed in 1991. As before it 
was organised by WAPDA, financed by UNDP and technical assistance was provided 
by the World Bank. The resultant Water Sector Investment Planning Study 
(WISP)(1991) concluded that institutional aspects of operation and maintenance of the 
irrigation system and efficient management of irrigated agriculture remained the major 
problems and that they required concentrated attention. Not much happened on the 
institutional front. 
The study undertaken jointly by Asianics International and John Mellor 
Associates and completed in (1994), was carried out with far smaller resources than the 
earlier studies, but benefited from the massive data sets and analysis in those studies. It 
again drew the conclusion that major institutional reform was needed. It added detail to 
the kinds of reform needed and dealt with some issues not previously raised. But, it 
follows well in the footsteps of its predecessors; it too has not been implemented. 
In view of all this money spent on studies, of broad agreement among the studies 
as to the needs, and lack of action on meeting those needs for institutional reform, one 
must ask why does the institutional reform called for not occur? Is it because the studies 
have failed to recognise that major costs are entailed in making institutional reform and 
that the benefits are indeed not up to the costs? We will argue to the contrary, but show 
that the urgency of institutional reform has been well masked by counter forces. We 
further argue that those counter forces have now weakened considerably and the 
underlying problem is in the process of being unmasked. Perhaps this is the time to get 
some action, and, perhaps by pointing out the masking, that action can come before the 
full damage to agriculture and the economy has occurred. That is the purpose of this 
paper. Irrigation Institutional Reform  401
THE HIDDEN NEED FOR REFORM 
The basic argument we present is that for the past few decades, and perhaps 
considerably longer, the irrigation system has been deteriorating with a substantial 
depressing effect on the growth rate of agricultural production. However, that 
depressing effect on the growth rate has been masked by 3 major counter forces: (1) a 
continuous addition to the volume of water available for irrigation; (2) major 
improvements in crop varietal yield potentials through agricultural research and 
extension; and (3) growth in fertiliser use. Further, the adequate growth rate of Pakistan 
agriculture has been concentrated primarily in one crop, cotton. The record in other 
crops has been at best modest. The growth rate for cotton can be high, but the 
extraordinary level of the recent past is not sustainable. In that context, fresh water 
aquifers have fallen rapidly and saline water aquifers have risen. 
 
The Overall Agricultural Growth Rate 
Pakistan has maintained a growth rate in agricultural GDP of over 4 percent for 
the past 2 decades (Table 1). That places Pakistan among the fast agricultural growth 
countries [Mellor (1995)]. Even adjusting for Pakistan’s high population growth rate, 
that still provides a growth rate per capita of 1 percent per annum. That still ranks 
Pakistan among the success stories of agricultural growth, but not among the best. That 
would provide, with normal multipliers a 1.5 percent rate of growth of the non-
agricultural sector derived from the agricultural growth. Thus, agriculture has been able 
to play a significant stimulative role in over-all economic growth in Pakistan. 
Given the recent, stunning World Bank evidence on the relation between sectoral 
growth and decline in poverty, Pakistan would be expected to experience a substantial 
decline in overall poverty directly attributable to an excellent agricultural growth record 
[Ravallion and Datt (1996)]. That indeed has been the case (Table 2). This is not a 
record that calls for radical, and politically risky and costly institutional reform of the 
irrigation institutions. 
The case for radical institutional reform in irrigation must be made at least on the 
grounds that the growth rate could have been a great deal higher if institutional reform 
had been made in irrigation institutions; or more compellingly that the past growth rate 
is not only unsustainable but will decline sharply with major deleterious effects on the 
over-all growth rate and in poverty levels, without major institutional change in the 
irrigation system. 
We approach this issue by discussing 4 key elements in past agricultural growth 
that we summarise in terms of their effect on the overall agricultural growth rate and 
from that approximate a net depressing effect of deterioration in the irrigation system 
that may require rectification through irrigation institutions reform. We start with the 
assumption  that  a high  agricultural  growth rate is essential to the objectives of rapidly  John W. Mellor  402
Table 1 
Growth Rate of Agriculture Sector, Pakistan, 1975–1991 








Decline in Poverty, 1963-64 to 1984-85 




Poverty Line  
(in Constant 
1984-85 Rs) 
1963-64 1969-70  1978-79  1984-85 
Rural Rs  159  36.79  44.24  29.23  24.10 
 Rs  172  42.69  50.76  35.19  29.21 
Urban Rs  185  40.88  34.09  23.64  19.40 
 Rs  207  48.89  42.55  30.95  25.61 
Source: Malik  (1991). 
 
rising per capita incomes, broad participation in that growth, and rapid decline in 
poverty. With that approach, the relevant question about irrigation reform is not the rate 
of return on the investment, itself largely intangible, but the effect on the growth rate. 
Of course, the substantial impact on the agricultural growth rate we will suggest would 
imply a very high rate of return on even very large investments in institutional reforms. 
 
Increased Volume of Water Used 
Over a 10 year period in the 1980s, the deliveries of surface irrigation increased 
by 23 percent due to Tarbela dam and rapid ground water development. About 60 
percent of the increment has gone to increase the cropped area under irrigation. The 
importance of these major additions to water supply should not be understated. In the 10 
year period, given that 95 percent of the area is irrigated, and if the response to more Irrigation Institutional Reform  403
water is linear (a reasonable assumption given that the bulk of the water went to expand 
the irrigated area) then water alone should have given a 2.2 percent growth rate, or over 
50 percent of the actual growth rate.  
Of course, the increase in water supply probably gave very little increase in 
agricultural output. Inefficiencies in delivery, misallocation of the water substantially to 
a privileged few, and so on, all decreased that return. But, that is the point. An objective 
of maintaining the marginal product of water as the supply expands, in consort with 
other inputs, including research on more efficient use, and improving institutions is a 
reasonable objective. If it  is not achieved, the nature of the associated institutional 
structures requires study and ameliorative action. 
 
Improved Crop Varieties 
Pakistan has a good agricultural research system and the results of that research 
have in general moved fairly quickly into use [Byerlee (1990); Azam, Evenson and 
Bloom (1991)]. It is difficult to estimate what the impact of that flow of research results 
would be on the rate of agricultural production growth. In the United States, which has 
a mature agriculture at the forefront of knowledge, yields rise continuously at about 0.5 
percent per year. Pakistan should be doing some catching up since its yields are well 
below those off the mature agricultures of the world. Calculations of potential yield 
show large existing gaps over average yields (Table 3). Closing a 50 percent yield gap 
(way below any of the numbers in Table 3) in 10 years would give a 7.2 percent growth 
rate; 20 years would give a 3.6 percent growth rate. 
 
Increased Fertiliser Use 
Fertiliser use in Pakistan has been growing at a very modest 6.5 percent rate for 
the past decade (Table 4). Hence, fertiliser growth has added little to the agricultural 
growth rate except as a complement to the increased water and research inputs. At most, 
the fertiliser growth rate may have added another 1 percentage point to the growth rate. 
 
Conclusions about the Agricultural Growth Rate 
If we view growth attributable to the preceding 3 forces as simply additive, then 
the growth rate should have been on the order of 6 to 7 percent per year. The actual 
growth rate was 4 percent, thus, the simple reasoning would go, deterioration of the 
irrigation system accounts for more than 2 percentage points per year of lost growth. 
Alternatively one can say that deterioration of the system roughly balances the additions 
to the water supply from the immense additions to irrigated area. 
These estimates are of course very rough and ready estimates. The attribution of 
the residual to water deterioration includes all the error factors in that residual. Thus, we John W. Mellor  404
 Table  3 
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Source:  Government of Pakistan (1992). 
*  Potential yield under experimental conditions. 
**  National average yield. Table 4 

















% Change Over 
Previous Year 
1982-83 944 15.3 248  7.4  26  30.0  1217  13.7 
1983-84  940  –0.4  267  7.7  27   3.8  1232   1.2 
1984-85  945   0.5  296  10.9  24  –11.1  1265   2.7 
1985-86 1106  17.0 346 16.9  32  33.3  1484  17.3 
1986-87 1268  14.6 372  7.5  39  21.9  1679  13.1 
1987-88 1264  –0.3 409    9.9  46  17.9  1719  2.4 
1988-89 1318  4.3 376 –8.1  27  –41.3  1721  0.1 
1989-90 1396  5.9 395  5.1  43  59.3  1834  6.6 
1990-91 1453  4.1 385 –2.5  27  –37.2  1865  1.7 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1992). 
  N= Nitrogen, P= Phosphorous, K= Potassium. John W. Mellor  406
need to raise some questions about the logic. How is deterioration of the water system 
subtracting on a compounded basis from the agricultural growth rate. It does so 
through: (1) increasing soil salinity from improper irrigation, (2) increasing uncertainty 
about water supply at the tail end; (3) shifting to high water using crops, such as 
sugarcane, near the headwork with a lower over-all productivity in use of water. 
On both numerical and logical grounds, attributing a loss of 2 percentage points 
of annual growth to irrigation deterioration rectifiable by institutional reform seems 
quite reasonable. It would be well for careful analysis of sources of growth to come up 
with a more carefully determined and precise number. But, for the moment it does 
justify attention to the issue.  
 
Unsustainable Success of Cotton 
Further light can be shed on the question of the loss in growth rate due to 
deterioration in the irrigation system. For the period 1983–1991, while agricultural 
production over-all was growing at slightly over 4 percent per year, or 1 percent per 
capita, every major crop except cotton and horticulture, was growing at between –1 
and +3 percent (wheat +3, sugarcane +2, coarse rice –1, basmati rice +3, oilseeds 0. 
Horticulture was growing at 6 percent per year, and cotton at 14 percent (Table 5). 
The extraordinary growth rate for cotton was largely due to a 12 percent yield 
growth rate. That in turn was due to a major break through in cotton variety and in 
pest control. A 6 percent growth rate may be sustainable for cotton with continued 
major efforts in varietal improvement and pest control, but certainly not 14 percent. 
Thus, with a more normal growth rate for cotton of say 6 percent, comprised of 2 
percent on area (as in the past) and 4 percent on yields the overall growth rate would 
be less than 3 percent, or no growth per capita. That eliminates the agricultural 
stimulus to over-all agricultural growth and to poverty reduction. 
These numbers are consistent with attribution of a 3.6 percent growth rate to 
technology in the preceding analysis. That further suggests that deterioration of the 
irrigation system could easily account for the full 2.2 percent provided by past 
investment in increasing the volume of water.  Even surface plausibility of an 
argument that the vast irrigation investment was simultaneously being nullified by 
inappropriate institutional structures is a powerful argument for reform. 
ENVIRONMENTAL DETERIORATION 
The root of environmental deterioration in irrigated agriculture of Pakistan lies 
in depletion of fresh water aquifers and the rise of saline aquifers. Table 6 shows the 
immediacy of this problem clearly. Table 5 
Area, Yield, and Production Growth Rates, Major Commodities, 1975–1991 
Period Area Yield Prod.  Area  Yield  Prod.  Area Yield  Prod. 
 Cotton  Wheat  Sugarcane 
1975–1991 2  8  10  2  2  4  2  2  4.0 
1975–1983 2  4  6  3  3  6  4  2  6.0 
1983–1991 2  12  14  1  2  3  0  2  2.0 
  Rice (IRRI)  Rice (Basm.)  Oilseeds 
1975–1991 2  2  4  5  0  5  –2  2  0.0 
1975–1983 2  3  9  7  1  8  –2  2  0.5 
1983–1991 –1  0  –1  4  –1  3  –2  2  0.0 
 Horticulture  Milk   
1975–1991 6  3  7  n.a.  n.a.  4       
1975–1983 7  4  9  n.a.  n.a.  2       
1983–1991 5  2  6  n.a.  n.a.  6      
Source: Government of Pakistan (1992). 
Note:  Horticulture includes vegetable and fruits. The yield figures are for production divided by area, and this also reflects change in composition within the 
subsectors.  John W. Mellor  408
Table 6 
Water Balance in the Indus Plain, 1992 
  Fresh Areas  Saline Areas 
Item Punjab  Sindh  Punjab  Sindh 
Gross Command Area (GCA)  
(Million Acres) 
18.88 4.33 5.01  10.79 
  Annual Flows (Million Acre Feet) 
Canal Diversions  41.60  11.98  12.32  33.26 
Rainfall 15.84  1.42  3.90  4.54 
Seepage to Groundwater         
Rainfall 1.52  0.17  0.39  0.54 
Tubewell Water  9.69  1.12  –  – 
Canal Water (incl. field)  20.68  5.41  6.26  14.24 
River Losses (–)/gains (+)  –1.26  0.47  –0.18  0.72 
Groundwater Pumpage         
Private Tubewells  31.64  3.52  –  – 
Government Tubewells  6.76  0.37  –  – 
Evaporation Due Capillary Rise  1.99  2.92  2.40  11.33 
Net Groundwater Recharge  –9.75  +0.36  +3.82  +3.93 
Net Recharge Per Acre  –0.52  +0.08  +0.76  +0.36 
Source:  Masood and Kutcher (1992). 
 
FAILURES OF THE EXISTING CANAL SYSTEM 
The existing irrigation system has 3 major sources of failure: (1) unsatisfactory 
maintenance; (2) failure to follow the operational rules essential to efficient water use 
given the design of the system; (3) improper modification of the canal distribution 
system. The first of these failures is due to inadequate provision for raising resources 
from the users and failure to use those resources efficiently. The 2nd and 3rd arise 
from the scarcity value of water and failure to insulate the irrigation institutions from 
inequitable distribution of the power to influence water allocation decisions. Thus, 
when reform is discussed it must treat the two quite different issues of raising 
resources and equity. 
In addition to the direct effects, each of these problems bias allocation of water 
towards the head reaches of the system. This results, not so much in less water per 
crop acre at the tail ends, as excessive drawing of ground water, or reduced 
percentage of the area irrigated at the tail ends. Irrigation Institutional Reform  409
Maintenance 
It is generally agreed that maintenance of the irrigation system is completely 
inadequate, with consequent shrinking of the canal capacity and consequently 
increasingly scarce and unreliable water. This creates a vicious circle of higher risk 
and hence lower returns, consequent diminished capacity and willingness to pay for 
water, lower collections of water charges, and on to poorer maintenance and even 
lower returns to water. It is also agreed that there is a dual problem of inadequate 
level of funding and inefficient utilisation of the funds that are made available. 
It is estimated [Agricultural Consulting Engineers (1990)] that there is a 30 
percent gap between maintenance needs and actual maintenance collections in the 
Punjab. The gap in the Sindh is 51 percent. In those 2 provinces alone the gap 
amounts to nearly half a billion Rs or about $13 million. That is not large compared 
to total budgets in Pakistan, but is nevertheless a significant addition to public sector 
deficits. It makes the search for means of users paying for maintenance worth while. 
In any case, whether the sum is large or small it is not forthcoming under present 
public expenditure realities. Thus adequate maintenance will require increased user 
charges. That in turn requires the reforms that will increase the equity and the 
certainty of water distribution, with consequent higher real returns to the water that is 
paid for. 
One barrier to higher user charges is the inefficiency with which maintenance 
is now performed. It is difficult to argue that farmers should pay more when it is self 
evident that existing funds are poorly utilised. That argues for farmer control of 
maintenance. 
The major maintenance problem is failure to desilt the channels adequately. 
This not only reduces flow, but increases head, due to the higher level of the canal 
bottom, into the discharges, increasing the proportion of the flow that is used in the 
upper reaches of the canal. 
Within the context of the maintenance resources, personnel costs per 
employee have been increasing much faster than the inflation rate. In addition, work 
by contractors for desilting seem to be frequently non cost effective. [Vander Velde 
(1990); van Waijjen and Bandaragoda (1992)]. Similarly desilting is not targeted to 
where it would do the most good [Vander Velde (1990)]. The upshot is that while 
maintenance funds are inadequate they are also used ineffectively. 
 
Failure to Follow Operating Rules 
The irrigation canals have been designed on the assumption of specified levels 
of flows. In practice, in some canals at some times, the flows are far less than 
specified, adding to maintenance costs through increased silting. In other canals and 
at other times, the flows are far greater than design capacity, particularly as a result John W. Mellor  410
of the larger water availability from Mangla and Tarbella, with consequent increased 
breaching and erosion of canals. Both too much and too little water have the effect of 
increased maintenance costs, and that to in a context of inadequate maintenance 
funds.  
One of the key operational rules under which the system was designed is that 
when water flow cannot be maintained at the design level, say 70 percent of capacity, 
then it should be shut off completely. That rule is generally not followed. A major 
reason for that is the gradual shift away from the warabundi system, with its set 
rotations, to a more power based system that responds to political power [Kuper and 
Strosser (1992); Kijne and Levine (1991)]. Thus, changes in the rotation and changes 
in the time various channels are kept open not only brings inequity, but also 
contributes to increasing over-all maintenance costs in a context in which 
maintenance is already inadequate. Of course, the vested interests in this breaching of 
the rules are by definition powerful and hence not easily coopted into the reform 
system recommended steadily over the past 2 decades. 
 
Improper Modification of the System 
It is important to recognise that the initial system design was intended to 
impose water scarcity on users, so that the water could be spread over a larger 
number of users. It is water scarcity that brings conflicts that have the unintended 
effect of bringing inefficiency to operation of the system. Scarcity systems require a 
high degree of cooperation amongst all users and administrators of the system. A 
situation of highly unequal power relationships makes such cooperation exceedingly 
difficult and builds powerful vested interests in the very factors that cause 
deterioration of the system. 
The system was designed to minimise the extent to which distribution could 
be changed in response to powerful interests. In that context, it was natural that the 
system would be modified to allow full sway to the vested influences. 
The simplest modifications are of course illegal tampering with the moghas or 
outlets. New outlets may be placed, either illegally, or by using power to get a legal 
addition of an outlet. This increases flows in the upper reaches of the canal system. 
When steps are taken to increase the flow, farmers with influence in the middles 
reaches start taking illegally large amounts, so that once again flow does not reach 
the tail ends, with consequent environmental and productivity impairment. 
  
ELEMENTS OF REFORM 
Irrigation institution reform in Pakistan must strike at the heart of the basic 
problems. It must: (1) provide funds, technical input, and oversight for efficient 
maintenance; (2) ensure that operational rules essential to efficiency are followed; Irrigation Institutional Reform  411
and, (3) prevent improper modification of the system. Conceptually these are simple 
straight foreword requirements, but they are requirements that the present system 
does not meet. 
At a more operational level, the foregoing elements translate into a longer set: 
(1) giving responsibility for the downstream activities, those close to the farmer/ 
users, to user groups that are democratically organised and run; (2) establishing a 
judicial system that would ensure democratically run user groups by not only 
providing an appeal body for undemocratic behaviour, but would look for anti-
democratic behaviour, seek it out and rectify it; (3) provide an overview authority for 
upstream activities that place system operation, new projects, and water related 
research and extension, that is effectively servicing the user groups with scale 
economy related upstream activities; and (4) provide flexibility in financial and 
administrative controls and hence release technical personnel to effectively service 
downstream users. 
These elements, simple on the surface require radical change in the irrigation 
institutions. 
 
SPECIFICS OF REFORM 
The reform specifics have 3 major elements: (1) establishment of irrigation 
authorities with authority to manage personnel and finances in a manner most 
suitable to efficient irrigation; (2) establishment of democratic farmer/user groups; 
(3) establishment of a system of water charges that would fully cover operation and 
maintenance costs. 
We provide just enough detail on the specifics to relate to the preceding 
arguments for radical institutional reform. The operational details are contained in the 
numerous studies by the World Bank and WAPDA, and by JMA/Asianics leading to 
the recommendations for such institutions. 
 
Irrigation Authorities 
Irrigation authorities would operate the primary portions of one or more canal 
systems including ensuring maintenance and generating revenues to cover costs. It 
would include management, technical personnel for operating the system, and a cadre 
of technical personnel to render assistance to the user groups. 
The critical element is to remove irrigation management and finances from the 
current situation of intrusive political interference with operation of the system. One 
reason the present system survives is that it offers a lot to administrative staff, 
powerful political interests, and to powerful farmers. Unfortunately, not only is 
equity lost, but efficient operation, and the potential for high agricultural growth rates 
are also lost. John W. Mellor  412
The purpose of an irrigation authority is to establish accountability for the 
operation, maintenance, and most important, high rates of return to the irrigation 
system. To achieve that end requires a clear set of objectives and operating rules, 
making public those objectives and rules, and annual reports on the adherence to 
them and to the results. 
Highest priority is to have clear rules for relating to the user groups with 
respect to irrigation charges and services to be rendered. Given the exigencies of 
modern agriculture, the system must establish certainty with respect to the time and 
quantity of water delivered to the user groups. That must in turn establish reliability 
with individual farmers. Establishing budgets, raising resources, and deploying them 
effectively would be a requisite of the authorities. 
An important purpose of establishing the authorities is to attract high quality 
personnel. The stature and political independence of those operating the authorities 
must be established and then the professionalism of the staff. An independent 
authority would be able to set salary scales and working conditions that attracted the 
best and left them in a position to make the fullest use of their talents. Individual 
irrigation authorities would compete against each other against tangible measures of 
productivity and thereby establish pride and motivation on the part of the staff. 
 
User Groups 
There is now ample experience throughout Asia that farmers’ organisations 
are providing far more responsible management of irrigation systems than any 
bureaucracy. It is most important that Pakistan move speedily in that direction. 
Pakistan’s experience with user groups has been more limited, and less successful 
than that of other countries of the region. User groups formed to develop improved 
irrigation systems have generally dissolved when the system was finished and hence 
have not served the critical function of effectively managing the systems. 
The lack of success of user groups in Pakistan may trace from the highly 
unequal distribution of land, economic, and political power in rural areas. Supporting 
this view is the substantial success of farmers organisations, including the 
management of water in the Agha Khan Support Foundations work in the more 
egalitarian societies of Gilgit and adjacent areas. Thus, one argument against 
irrigation reform is that in Pakistan it will not work. The response is that ways must 
be found for irrigation reform to work, and there seem not to be models that succeed 
without democratic user groups.  
If inegalitarian rural social structures stand in the way, then if the problem is 
as urgent as we have made out, a way around this must be found. That is probably a 
judicial system that seeks out inequity and rectifies it. Simply serving as an appeal Irrigation Institutional Reform  413
body is not sufficient in the face of major differences in power. Probably a data 
collection and analytic content is necessary for such a body to work. And, of course, 
it must have access to a relatively free press to bring attention to its findings and its 
actions. 
Once the hurdle of forming democratic user organisations is solved, the rest 
becomes straight forward. They need an administrative structure and a decision- 
making structure. They must budget for expenditures and management of those 




At present water charges are nominal in level, and act simply as a tax to 
provide general revenues to the provincial governments [Agricultural Consulting 
Engineers (1990); Chaudhry (1987); Pakistan/USAID (1985); Government of 
Pakistan (1990)]. That needs to be replaced by a system of charges for the specific 
purpose of operating and maintaining the irrigation system at all levels. It needs to be 
set by the user groups in accordance with those groups’ budgets.  
If water charges were raised sufficiently to cover all the projected costs of 
canal operation and maintenance plus the SCARP tubewells, that have an important 
conservation function, the water charges would have to increase about 5 times from 
the current level of roughly Rs 1 per acre inch. That would be about 1/6th the price 
typically paid for tubewell water [Meinzen-Dick and Sullins (1993)]. Thus, even if 
one discounts the returns to canal water by half (which is an overstatement for a 
farmer managed system) then the water charges would be less than 1/3rd the price for 
purchased water. In addition, the maintenance and operating costs are probably 
overstated given that an authority would increase the efficiency of those operations. 
A wide range of approaches have provided estimates of the marginal returns 
to water. Depending on location and the modeling approach, those studies estimate 
the marginal productivity of water from as low as Rs 20 to as high as Rs 107.  Even 
the lowest figure is far higher than the requisite water charge. In any case current 
water charges are not consequential at less than 1 percent of the gross value of output 
per acre. Even doubling or tripling that leaves a barely consequential figure. 
Thus, it would seem that the resistance to water charges is less that the level 
is onerous and more cynicism over whether or not efficiency ever can or will be 
increased with higher water charges. Thus, a prime function of the user groups is to 
provide evidence, on the basis of actual performance, that water charges are actually 
related to the availability and productivity of water.   
A very important conclusion follows from the foregoing. Namely, it is 
unreasonable to think in terms of increased water charges without major institutional John W. Mellor  414
changes that will increase the marginal returns to water from canals to the levels 
derived from small tubewells. The technical feasibility of this is well proven. The 
feasibility of effecting the requisite institutional changes is not. 
A further point follows: improvement of the irrigation systems requires more 
expenditure on maintenance and more cost effective maintenance; but the funds 
cannot be raised from general revenues nor from farmers until efficiency is increased 
and that requires major institutional reform to increase the productivity of the system. 
Thus, one continually comes back to institutional reform. The partial answers have 
not worked for good reason and hence will not work. 
 
HOW TO PROCEED 
There is no set pattern for process to bring about major institutional change. 
Each approach must be examined for its feasibility under today’s circumstances in 
Pakistan. 
Some would argue an all at once approach—all irrigation segments in all 
provinces proceed simultaneously. That admits to the urgency of the situation and 
that the knowledge base for what needs to be done is well established. And, that the 
risk for some takers is reduced by all proceeding together. 
Some would argue for a few pilot efforts, say one or two irrigation segments 
in one province, for example Punjab. That approach may admit to the urgency and to 
the technical needs, but also argues that there remains some uncertainty about the 
optimal institutional approach. And, certainly there is uncertainty as to how well the 
changes will in fact succeed.  
Finally, it is argued that with a pilot or two, the full power of the various 
expert bodies and the political system can ensure success before proceeding to more 
diffused change. In this context, it must be remembered that the most trenchant 
criticism of the radical institutional change is: yes that is a desirable change, but the 
results will be no different, because the same people will be there with the same 
power. Perhaps it is the difficulty of changing the people and their behaviour that 
calls for a pilot effort with deep commitment to that approach. 
But, even before a pilot effort, consensus must be developed that: (1) the 
problem is truly acute (that consensus does not exist at present, particularly amongst 
a substantial set of highly placed, highly experienced and knowledgeable persons); 
(2) the precise form is known that reform must take to meet the critical problem as 
perceived by the key policy-makers; (3) politically powerful groups can be dealt 
with; and (4) whether it is best to proceed with a pilot effort or to move all at once. 
Consensus has yet to be developed on any of these 4 points.  
 
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Radical institutional change for irrigation cannot succeed without other 
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Most pressing is solution of the fertiliser supply problem, followed by tackling 
the increasingly inefficient use of fertiliser at the farm level. Under the fertiliser 
regime of the recent past, the productivity of better water use will be greatly reduced 
by the inability to proceed with the appropriate degree of intensification of 
agriculture, due to lack of fertiliser. 
Not as pressing as fertiliser supply and demand policy, but nevertheless 
important, is the need for further improvements in the agricultural research extension 
system, particularly including the greatly under researched issues of irrigation 
agriculture and associated irrigation efficient. 
Finally, price policy must be made more rational so as to allow the most 
efficiency use of water. That rationality will undoubtedly result in increased cotton, 
horticulture, and livestock feed production and reduced sugarcane production. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The irrigation crisis in Pakistan’s agriculture is masked by the superb 
conditions for growth that have allowed a highly respectable growth rate in 
Pakistan’s agriculture despite a major negative effect from a deteriorating irrigation 
system. In the past agricultural growth could probably have been 2 percentage points 
better, that is a 6 percent growth rate. That would in turn have allowed a superlative 
overall growth rate and extraordinarily rapid decline in poverty.  
A 6 percent agricultural growth rate would place Pakistan amongst the worlds 
very best agricultural performers. To do so, recognises that Pakistan has a superb 
irrigation resource, waiting to be reformed, is now at a level of productivity that 
would allow a long period of “catch-up growth”, providing 2 percentage points faster 
growth than could be sustained over the long term, has a strong demand situation 
from rising domestic incomes and consequent effective demand for horticulture and 
livestock, and a strong potential market for high value irrigated agriculture output, 
particularly in the Middle East. 
Looking ahead, the choices now appear to be not between a good growth 
record and a superlative one; but rather between a good record and a poor one. The 
contribution to growth, perhaps 2 percentage points worth, from increased physical 
supply of water seems to have run its course. That factor alone requires improvement 
in management of existing supplies of water. In addition much of future growth will 
have to come from livestock, with its requirements for high quality fodder and 
consequent heavy demand for water, and from horticulture, that also requires well 
controlled and reliable water. 
The critical need is an irrigation institution that will: (1) facilitate a level of 
water charges that will cover maintenance that will assure high quality delivery; (2) 
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(3) assure equity in supply of water, another way of saying that the technical rules of 
operation will be followed. The present system breaks down on all three of these 
counts and so it is improperly used and inadequately maintained. 
The foregoing conditions can be met by irrigation units controlled in a 
democratic manner by the users. Democratic control removes the current inequities. 
To succeed in the face of existing unequal political power requires strong rules and 
an oversight body that ensures democratic operation. User control means user 
incentives to ensure good maintenance and operating procedures that lead to 
willingness to pay for maintenance and to ensure that it is efficiently provided. 
Democratic control does not meet the need for a high level of technical 
competence. That must be assured by providing technical oversight of the irrigation 
units and access to technical knowledge. That system must initiate from the 
Government and reach down to all levels of the irrigation system. 
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